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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
:MICHAEL BENJA~IIN, et al, I 
Respond~ents, 
vs. 
BERT LIETZ, 
Appeltant. 
Case No. 
7330 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
This is a suit in equity to enjoin the defendent, Bert 
Lietz, from operating his planing mill so as to cause 
loud and unusual noises in the late evening and early 
Inorning hours and on Sundays. The trial court found 
the issues, both of fact and of law, in favor of the plain-
tiffs and the defendent appealed. 
The statement of facts by the appellant is incomplete 
and in some instances inaccurate. There are some con-
flicts in the evidence, but the trial court resolved those 
conflicts in favor of the plaintiffs (respondents). Ad-
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2 
mittedly, the Supreme Court in an equity case can and 
does review the evidence. Art. VII, Sec. 9, Utah Con-
stitution. ·However, the court has adopted a consistent 
judicial policy of resolving all doubts in favor of the 
findings of the trial court because it had the opportunity 
to view the witnesses. St.anley v. Btamley, 97 Utah 520, 
94 P. 2d. 465; Baldwin v. Nielson, 110 Utah 172, 170 P. 2d. 
179; Maxfi.eld v. Sansbury, 110 Utah 280, 172 P. 2d. 122; 
Graham v. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 P. 2d. 524. For ex-
ample in the 1tfaxfield v. Sansbury case the court said: 
"This is an action in equity in which it be-
comes our duty to determine questions of fact 
as well as questions of law, but unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings and 
judgJ.nent by the district court, its decision will 
stand.'' 
Thus, where the evidence is in conflict, we assume 
that under the rule announced by the above cases, the 
Supreme Court will accept the findings of the trial court. 
THE EVIDENCE 
The defendant owns and operates a planing mill 
at 2032 South lOth East, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 57). 
The plaintiffs and their families occupy for residential 
purposes property immediately adjacent to the planing 
mill. (R. 69, 75, 98, 102). Prior to 1943 the defendant 
operated his planing mill during the day time, but after 
the normal work day, there were no disturbing noises. 
The trial court so found (R. 41, finding 7) and the find-
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ing Is abundantly supported by the evidence. Forrest 
Howard Green moved into the neighborhood in January 
of 1!140. (R. 75). \Yhen he first n1oved there, he was not 
disturbed by any noises during the nighttime, but in 
19-±~ when "Jir. Lietz started to make boxes the noise 
eontinned until about eleven o'clock at night. (R. 70-71). 
~fiehael Benjmnin 1narried the defendant's sister and 
moYed into the area in 1934. (R. 75, 77). All was quiet 
and peaceful then. (R. 77). In 1943, the defendant got an 
order to n1anufaehue boxes and commenced evening 
work with large erew~ of men. (R. 79, 85). There was 
never any shift work prior to 1943. (R. 88). ~Irs. Ben-
jamin i~ the defendant's sister. She had lived in the area 
in question all of her life. (R. 107). She testified that 
frmn 1928 until the war the defendant never worked a 
shift at night. (R. 107). There wasn't any noise at night 
prior to 1943 that was loud enough to disturb them. 
(R. 108). 
In 1943 the defendant became engaged in war work 
and started to use an early evening shift that would 
start at 4:30 or 5 :00 p.m. and work until 10:00 or 11 :00 
p.m. (R. 70, 78, 82, 108). The defendant also constructed 
a new cinder block building and filled it with machinery, 
1nuch of which was new equipment. This building was 
co.nstructed according to the defendant in February 
of 1944 ( R. 58) and according to Benjamin in 
1945 (R. 86). The difference is not material for in any 
event it was 1944 or later. 'There was much new machin-
ery acquired for the new building. When counsel for 
plaintiffs examined the defendant on direct examination 
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he stated that much of the equipment shown on exhibit 
A was new. (R. 58-62). H·e later said that all of it was in 
replacement of old machinery except a re-saw machine. 
(R. 150, 158). Then later he admitted again that much of 
the machinery was new and not a replacement. The new 
machinery consisted of a re-saw rnachine (R. 162), the 
dust collector (R. 163), a moulder (R. 164), a blower 
(R. 164), a planer (R. 164), and other machines like a 
planer (R. 165) were replaced with heavier equipment. 
The installed capacity was increased from 125 horse 
power in 1927 to 1490 at date of trial. (R. 117). The 
defendant also had never prior to about 1947 had any 
machinery located on the outside of his buildings. (R. 
161). But in 1947 he poured a cement platform on the 
south and west sides of the new cinder block building 
and installed rnachinery thereon. (R. 61-62). 
The night work done by the late shift causes very 
loud and disturbing noises. This was testified to by 
Green (R. 71) who said; "They worked with great ra-
pidity, and the noise was incessant and to the extent that 
we could hear it, at least, it disturbed us; we couldn't 
sleep." The noise was so loud that it could not be shut 
out of the house by closing the windows ( R. 71). It con-
tinued until about 11 p.m. (R. 72). In the spring of 1948 
the defendant would run the outside machinery as early 
as 4 :00 a.m. in the morning and this was a frequent oc-
currence. (R. 73). Benjamin described the nois·e from the 
boxes, and also mentioned the operating of a saw filer 
which made a grating noise of carborundum. stone rub-
bing on steel, (R. 80) and the piercing noise of the planer 
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which could be heard for five blocks (R. 87). Mrs. 
Benja1nin said the noise was so loud and continuous 
that it aln1ost drove her crazy. (R. 108). It has been so 
bad that the Benjamins were contemplating selling their 
home to get away from it (R. 92). It has been so bad at 
nights that they have left the house to get away from it. 
(R. 83). Peterson compared the noise of the planer with 
a siren (R. 94) and said that it was a noise that would 
be Yery irritating to hi1n. (R. 95). Arthur Lloyd said the 
noise "~as loud and that it disturbed him ver)~ much. 
(R. 99). The noise is described in detail hy the various 
witnesses and there can be no doubt that it was loud, 
unusual and penetrating as was found by the court. (R. 
-W. finding 3). 
The defendant has been requested to stop the noises 
in the evening and early morning hours and on Sunday, 
but he has refused to do so. (R. 82). In fact while the 
defendant was under a court order to shut the machinery 
off at 7 :00 p.n1. he operated t.he planer one night until 
7:31p.m. (R. 95). (Court order R. 16). He also had men 
working in the shop pounding on boards as late as 1 :30 
in the morning, (R. 112) in violation of the court order. 
There was one order to show cause, but it was dismissed 
after the defendant was admonished, (R. 20-25) and 
the court made its instruction more explicit (R. 25). 
Still within a matter of 45 days the defendant ignored 
the order and operated the big planer located outside the 
building until 7 :31. ( R. 95). There is thus ample evi-
dence that injunctive action is necessary. 
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In addition it should be noted that the mill is located 
in a com1nercial zone where the operation of a planing 
mill ''using in excess of 50 horsepower'' is prohibited. 
(See section 6720 of Ordinance as pleaded in amended 
complaint and admitted in evidence by stipulation (R. 
:n, 32, :15 and 168). A non-conforming use was permitted 
if the 1nill were in existence prior to 1927 when the ordi-
nance was enacted. The mill in question was installed 
prior to 1927 (R. 57). But section 6728 permitted the 
extension of the use only ''throughout the building; 
provided that no structural alterations are made there-
in.'' If the building were destroyed by fire, explosion or 
act of God, etc., to the extent of sixty per cent of its 
assessed value, it could not be reconstructed. The ob-
vious purpose of the non-conforming use section being 
to tolerate existing uses, but to prohibit their expansion 
or rebuilding. The defendant increased his installed 
horsepower after 1927 from 125 to 149~ (R. 117). He 
constructed a new or additional building and continued 
to use the old building also. (R. 58). He poured a cement 
platform on the outside of the new building and installed 
machinery the ron. (R. 61 and 68). The rated capacity of 
his plant or mill in 1947 was 57 K\V or over seventy 
horsepower. This is shown by Exhibit B as explained 
by witness Shaw. (R. 127, 126). There was a meter in-
stalled on the mill which measured the highest use of 
electrical energy during a fifteen minute average each 
month and in 1947 there was not a single month that the 
use was under fifty horsepower. (Exhibit B). Whenever 
Exhibit B shows a use of above 35 KW it is above 50 
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horsepower antl reference to exhibit B will show that 
the lowest nwnth in l~H/ was June with 36 KW. The 
appellant ~tates in his brief that in 1947 the power use 
wa~ always under fift.y horsepower and cites the record 
at page 12:~ to support the state1nent. (Brief page 9). ?\fr. 
~haw did so state, but this was an obvious error corrected 
both by ~[r. Shaw and also by exhibit B which shows the 
monthly nses to be all above fifty horsepower. In 1948 
six of the months shown were above fifty horsepower 
and only five were below. (Exhibit B). The court found 
and the foregoing evidence supports the finding that the 
defendant's mill has been "using in excess of fifty 
horsepower'' within the 1neaning of the ordinance and 
that the r:nill with such use of electrical power has been 
enlarged and altered, and that the capacity was increased 
in violation of the ordinance. 
Appellant in his brief states at page ten that plain-
tiff~ did not complain of the noise occuring on Sundays. 
This is not the evidence. ~f rs. Benjamin said that the 
noise on Sundays and during the week nights was very 
bad and that they would be satisfied if he would "quit 
at a reasonable hour during the week and not operate 
on Sundays." (R. 110). 
Appellant states at page 9 of his brief that the de-
fendant's father prior to 1927 and the defendant since 
then have worked crews at night in the mill. There is 
evidence to this effect. (R. 119). But there is also evi-
dence to the contrary, (R. 108) and the trial court re-
solved this conflict in favor of the plaintiffs. It is stated 
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that a ~lerrill Appliance Company employee was not 
bothered by the noiS'e (appellant's brief, R. 10). How-
ever this emp,lovee did not work in the vicinity at night 
' ~ (R. 134) nor did he live in the area. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
Appellant's first and primary contention is that the 
complaint fails to state a cause of action. In this regard 
there are two reeent Utah cases, neither of which is 
cited by appellant, and both of which support the theory 
of the plaintiffs. They are Thompson v. Anderson, 107 
Utah 331, 153 P. 2d. 665 and Brough v. Ute St,ampede 
Ass'n, 105 Utah 446, 142 P. 2d. 670. In the Thompson v. 
Anderson case the first assignment of error questioned 
the sufficiency of the complaint. The court noted that 
the complaint alleged: (1) that the parties lived in ad-
joining houses; (2) that defendant operated a business 
on property located immediately to the rear of plaintiffs 
residence; (3) that the conduct of defendant's business 
is a nuisance in that it causes ''loud and unusual noise 
from power driven saws. . . . loud slaming of doors 
during the night time; hammering during the daytime 
and the night time; sound equipment which caused 'loud, 
unusual and shrieking noises' ; loud and unusual noises 
of. large vaculllil cleaners;" ( 4) notice to the defendant 
of the disturbance; and ( 5) his refusal to abate it." The 
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trial court ovt>rrulecl a general den1urrer. This was as-
signed as error. 
As in the instant case, en1phasis was there placed by 
the defendant upon the fact that the business in question 
was a lawful business. Said the court : 
''Firstly, defendant points out that there is 
no cmnplaint that defendant's business is not a 
a lawful business, and that the sounds which an-
noy plaintiffs are not unusual and not the ordi-
nary sounds emanating from such a business as 
defendant is conducting. But even sounds norm-
ally inherent in the nature of a business may 
under some circumstances constitute a nuisance. 
In Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass 'n, 105 Utah 446, 
142 P. 2d. 670, 674, it was not alleged or shown 
that the noises of which complaint was made were 
any but the usual noises attendant upon a carnival. 
The projected business was lawful, had in fact 
been specifically licensed by the city council in 
past years, and yet we affirmed the judgrnent en-
joining the holding of the carnival in front of 
plaintiff's property .... " 
The court then expressly held that the complaint stated 
a cause of action and that the general demurrer was 
properly overruled. Every one of the five allegations 
noted b~~ the court in Thompson v. Anderson, supra, is 
set forth in the complaint here. (1) That defendant 
operates a planing mill in 2032 South lOth East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, (paragraph II) and each of the plain-
tiffs is in lawful possession of property adjacent to the 
planing mill and each uses the property for residential 
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purpose6. rrhe particular address of each plaintiff is 
given. (paragraph VI and YII). (2) That defendant 
operates tho planing n1ill (paragraphs II, III and IV). 
(3) That tho operation of the mill by defendant causes 
''loud and unusual noises which result from the opera-
tion of woodworking machinery'' (paragraph III) that 
the Inachiner~T is operated substantially every night be-
tween 6 :00 and 10 :00 p.m. and on occasions to later 
hours, (paragraph IV); that the noises can be heard 
several blocks from the mill (paragraph IV); that it 
causes dust and shavings to blow onto plaintiffs' prem-
ises, (paragraph IV); that the noise is so loud as to in-
terfere and it does interfere with the peace, quiet and 
enjoyment of their homes, interferes with normal sleep 
and causes great disturbance and discomfort to each of 
the plaintiffs and his family. (paragraph VIII). ( 4) 
That plaintiffs have demanded that the defendant cease 
his night operations (paragraph IX). (5) That defen-
dant refused (paragraph IX). In addition it is alleged 
that prior to 1943 the mill was not operated at nights or 
on Sundays; that all of the plaintiffs' property was oc-
cupied for residential purposes prior to 1943; that after 
1943 the noise complained of started. 'Thus, every ele-
ment alleged in the Thompson v. Anderson case, Supra, 
is alleged here and more. We consider the Thompson v. 
Anderson case to be directly in point and to justify com~ 
pletely our contention that the complaint states a cause 
of action. 
Aside from the Thompson case, supra, it seems dear 
that the making of loud and unusual noises in the night-
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tilne i~ a ntusance. Section 104-56-1, U.C.A. 1943, pro-
vides: 
'·Anything which is injurious to health, or 
indecent or offensive to the senses; or an obstruc-
tion to the free use of property, so as to interfere 
with the con1fortable enjoyment of life or prop-
erty, i~ a nuisance and the snhject of an action. 
Such action may be brought by any person whose 
property is injuriously affected, or whose per-
sonal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance; and 
by the judgn1ent the nuisance may be enjoined or 
abated and dan1ages may also be recovered.'' 
This statute was construed in Brough v. Ute Stam-
pede AssJn, supra 105 Utah 446, 142 P. 2d. 670. Our case 
is within the cases and also the statute. Noises which in 
the day time would be all right may be and often do be-
come a nuisance if made during the nighttime. The two 
Utah cases cited above so hold. The Utah cases are in 
accord with the overwhelming weight of authority. See 
for example Rose Freidman v. Js,adore Keil, 166 Atl. 194 
86 A.L.R. 995 ~ Ilig.qins v. Decor,ah Prod1tce 001npany, 
2-l-2 N.\V. 109 (Iowa) and annotation at 86 A.L.R. 998. 
We submit that even without the ordinance and the 
'alleged violation of it the complaint states a cause of 
action. \Ye will defer our discussion of the ordinance 
until later and then discuss the allegation concerning it 
as well as its construction. 
There are two other matters to which we should like 
to direct the court's attention in its determination of 
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whether or not the complaint states a cause of action. 
First, the contention that it does not is made for the first 
tjn1e on appeal. Admittedly this is an objection that can 
be made at anytime, but if made for the first time on ap-
peal it is looked upon with disfavor and every resonable 
presumption must be rnade in favor of the complaint. 
Secondly, where evidence is admitted without objection, 
the Supreme Court will assume that any issues covered 
by the evidence but not covered by the pleading is liti-
gated by mutual consent. Thus if the evidence shows a 
grounds for relief and it came in without objection, the 
decision could stand even if it were not supported by 
the pleadings. See Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 
P. 2d. 262; and cases cited therein. In that case the 
complaint was for a divorce. The evidence showed that 
there had never been a valid marriage. The evidence 
was all in and the court granted an annulment, fixed 
custody of children and attorney's fees-all without 
pleadings to support it. This was affirmed, the court 
saying: 
"Where the parties consent to the litigation 
of an issue not properly raised by the pleadings 
and the court hears the evidence adduced thereon 
and determines the merits of the issue thus joined, 
neither party is in a position to complain that 
such issue was not strictly within pleadings.'' 
We submit that the complaint is clearly sufficient as 
against the contention raised for the first time on appeal 
that it does not state a cause of action. 
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COXTb~~TlO~ OF THE APPELLANT AS TO 
~lTFFICI"B~XCY OF CO~IPLAINT. 
(a) • • Lawful Business'' Argument. 
\Ye have difficulty determining what it is contended 
is 1nissing in the complaint to make it state a cause of 
action. The quotation on page 19 of the brief does not 
refer to a case such as this. The complaint did not seek, 
nor did the trial court grant, an absolute injunction 
against the operation of the mill. It permitted its opera-
tion during· a normal work day from 7 :30 a.m. until 
6:00 p.m. It enjoined the operation during the evening 
night and early morning hours. 
The appellant infers that because the operation of 
a planing mill is a lawful business, it can operate all 
night and make as much noise as a normal planing mill 
will make. Appellant states at page 18 of his brief: 
''A planing mill means lumber will be sawed 
and planed. Necessarily that means noise, but un-
less machinery is running smoothly and unneces-
sary vibration eliminated, the planing mill is not 
efficient and must fail.'' 
In his answer and again at the trial defendant empha-
sized that the buildings were built under city permits 
and War Production Board orders. He seems to assume 
that since a planing mill is a lawful business it can oper-
ate night and day so long as it makes no more noise than 
a normal mill. Such simply is not the law. Both of the 
two Utah cases, Th01npson l'. And ers•on, S'Lt·pra, and 
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Brough v. Ute Sta.1npede Ass'n, supra, held that a law-
ful business may be so operated as to make it a nuisance. 
T n the Thompson case the court said: 
"But even sounds normally inherent in the 
nature of a business may under some circum-
stances constitute a nuisance.'' 
and the court affirmed an injunction to prohibit the 
operation of power driven saws and sound equipment. 
In that case the court said that it was all right if defen-
dant tested his sound equipment providing the tests were 
for infrequent periods of not over five minutes each and 
provided the noise was confined to the daytime. The 
court went on to say: 
"The court makes a differentiation between 
noises during the night and those during the day, 
and takes notice of the fact that what might be a 
nuisance if occuring during the nighttime, would 
not be so during the daytime.'' 
This distinction would seem to answer completely the 
contention that there is no basis for closing the mill in 
so far as loud noises are concerned after 6 :00 p.m. and 
until 7 :30 a.m. when people normally desire to enjoy the 
peace and quiet of their home. 
The Brough case, supra, enlarges upon the idea that 
even a lawful business may be enjoined becaus·e the noise 
therefrom interferes with the peaceful use of adjacent 
property. Noises may or may not be nuisances depend-
ing upon the times and places in which they occur. The 
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court further stated that the fact that the business was 
lawful and eYen licensed by the city could not prevent 
it frmn being an actionable nuisance. 
In the Thmnpson case, supra, the court notes that 
where equipment is operated within the enclosure of a 
building it may not be nuisance, but that where it is oper-
ated on the outside it Inay be. In that case it was speak-
ing of a vacuum cleaner and said it would be all right 
if its operation were confined to the daytim~e and to a 
building. 
(b) A_rgument that Plaintiffs "moved to the Nuis-
ance.'' 
There is an intimation that appellant contends that 
plaintiffs have no cause of action because the planing 
mill existed in 1900 and the plaintiffs knowingly moved 
into the vicinity of it. This argument is unsound because 
complaint alleges, the evidence shows and the court found 
that the mill did not operate after 6 :00 p.m. prior to 1943. 
In this regard the general law is well stated in 39 Am. 
J ur. 4 72, Section 197 as follows : 
"As a rule, it is no justification for maintain-
ing a nuisance that the party complaining of it 
came voluntarily within its reach. Thus, accord-
ing to the weight of authority, the fact that a per-
son voluntarily comes to a nuisance by moving 
into the sphere of its injurious effect, or by pur-
chasing adjoining property or erecting a resi-
dence or building in the vicinity after the nuisance 
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is created, does not prevent him from recovering 
damages for injuries sustained therefrom, or de-
prive him of the right to enjoin its maintenance, 
es }Jecially where, by reason of changes in the 
stru,cture or bus,iness complained of, the annoy-
ance has since been increased." (Italics added) 
See also Riggins vs. Deoorah Prodtuce Co. supra, 242 
N.W. 109 ~ Freidrnan v. K eil, supra, 166 Atl. 194, 86 
A.L.R. 995. 
(c) Sunday Closing. 
The two ca.ses cited by appellant which hold Sun-
day closing laws to be unconstitutional because dis-
criminatory are not in point. (Appellants Brief, p. 19). 
They si1nply held that the statute or ordinance in quest-
tion was unconstitutional because it permitted eertain 
businesses to stay open and closed others and that there 
was no reasonable basis for the distinction made. Both 
cases, however, recognized that Sunday is a day of rest 
and that if there wer'e not unreasonable discrimination, 
businesses could be closed on Sundays. The only thing 
in those cases which we deem helpful here is the recogni-
tion of Sunday as a day of rest. That is exactly what the 
trial court did here. It recognized Sunday as a day of 
rest and enjoined the defendant from causing loud, un-
usual and disturbing noises on that day which would in-
terfere with the peace and enjoyment by plaintiffs of 
their properties. 
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II. THE DEFENDAN'T WAS OPERATING IN 
YIOLATION OF THE ORDINANCE. 
The appellant urges that the portion of the decree 
li1niting hin1 to fifty horsepower is erroneous because 
"?e did not show that he had not used more than fifty 
horsepower p-rior to 1927. It seems to us that in making 
this argument the appellant completely misses our con-
tention in regard to the ordinance. We do not contend 
that if the appellant would abandon his new building, 
the ce1nent platform and would place all the new equip-
ment in his old building that he could not use more than 
fifty horsepower. To the contrary, we admit the he oou.ld. 
But he i:-l not seeking to do so. ·He has enlarged his build-
ing, constructed a new platform and installed new ma-
chinery thereon. This enlargement the ordinance pro-
hibits. 
As we construe the ordinance it prohibits new plan-
ing mills ''using more than fifty horsepower'' from 
building in a commercial zone. Mills already in existence 
in 1927 were permitted to continue and to enlarge 
"throughout the building, provided that no structural 
alterations are made therein.'' We confess that under 
this ordinance the defendant could have expanded to use 
three hundred horsepower if he could have done so while 
confining himself to the original building and without 
sturcfural alterations. We deny, however, that he could 
expand his building or construct a new platform and in-
stall new machinery throughout the new structures. He 
could, under the ordinance, expand only to the confines 
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of his building as it existed in 1927. If it burned down, 
he could not rebuild it. If it were otherwise damaged to 
the extent of sixty per cent of its ass·essed value, it could 
not be repaired. Expansions which called for structural 
alterations could not be made. 
It is absolutey immaterial how many horsepower 
appellant used prior to 1927. If he desires to confine 
himself to the old building, we concede that there is no 
restriction placed on him hy the ordinance as to the num-
ber of horsepower he may use. But since he is operating 
a plant using n1ore than fifty horsepower, he was pro-
hibited from expanding beyond his original building, and 
when he did so he violated the ordinance. He was, there-
fore, properly enjoined from using more than fifty 
horsepower in his expanded plant-for only by so limit-
ing his horsepow.er would the new building, the cement 
pJatform and the new machinery installations therein 
be legal. 
There can be no doubt that his plant is now using 
more than fifty horsepower within the meaning of the 
ordinance. If the ordinance means installed capacity of 
the machinery the mill is above fifty horsepower becaus·e 
the installed capacity is 1490 horsepower according to 
the appellant's own testimony. (R. 117). If the ordinance 
means the rated capacity of the plant it is above fifty 
horsepower for in 1947 the ra:ted ca:pacity was 57 KW 
(over seventy horsepower). In 1948 the rated capacity 
was 48 KW (over sixty horsepower). (R. Exhibit B). 
If it means the amount of electrical energy used it is over 
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fifty horsepower for there was not a single month in 1947 
that the m.ill did not average for the one fifteen minute 
period 1neasured in excess of fifty horsepower. In 1948 
~ix out of the eleven nwnths of operation showed an aver-
age of over fifty horsepower. (Exhibit B). The inference 
sought to be given by the defendant that this heavy use 
probably \\~as simply turning on several machines all at 
once cau~ing a heavy, but mornentary, load is not sound. 
The figures given by Exhibit B reflect an average use 
over a fifteen minute period-not a momentary use. It 
narrows down to this : Either the defendant was not 
using fifty horsepower in 1944 or 1945 when he started 
his expansion program-and has thus now increased it 
beyond fifty horsepower which would be illegal; or he 
was using fifty horsepower in 1944 and then he illegally 
expanded a fifty horsepower mill into a new building and 
added new machinery. One of these two things must be 
correct and we do not care which. If he was not using.' 
fifty horsepow,er in 1927, then he has since illegally ex-
panded so that he now does. If he was using fifty horse-
power in 1927, then he illegally expanded beyond the 
confines of his existing building. Both are prohibited 
b~~ the ordinance. The injunction limiting him to fifty 
horsepower was entirely justified. If he were not en-
joined his past conduct demonstrates that he would con-
tinue to expand. 
The evidence shows that he also constructed a new 
building within 100 feet of a dwelling. Since his mill is 
over fifty horsepower, this was prohibited by ordinance. 
Sec. 6720) (b), (R. 168). 
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III. THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WERE 
PROPER. 
On page 22 of his brief, appellant contends that con-
clusion of law number four is erroneous. This conclusion 
is to the effect that defendant should be permitted to go 
to his shop to work after 6 :00 p.m., but that he must 
not do work that ''will create any noise which will disturb 
the peace and quiet of the neighborhood, 'or which c-an 
be heard by the pZaintiff s lin their homes." The objection 
apparently is to the italicized portion. Of course, an in4 
junctive order of this type must be reasonably construed. 
In Thomps-on v. Anderson, supra, 107, Ut:ah 331, the ob-
jection was made that the order was too broad. The 
court said: 
''In all cases like the present, where conduct 
of businesses is enjoined, the injunction must be 
interpreted reasonably, both by the partie~ and 
by the courts. The cardinal principal to be kept 
in mind at all times is that it is not noise as such, 
which is enjoined.' The injunction goes only to 
such noises as constitute a nuisance-such nois,es 
as annoy the normal individual and interferes 
with normal use and enjoyment of his property.'' 
Here the appellant had the findings and conclusions 
served on him on the 18th day of December. They were 
not entered until December 23. (R. 47). He made no 
suggested language changes nor did he object to any par-
ticular finding or conclusions. He should not be heard 
to pick out one narrow phrase from the findings, con-
clusions and decree and complain of it when the reason-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
able construction of the whole decree and of the pa~a­
graph in question is that tmreasonable or unusual noises 
are enjoined. Certainly that is the fair and reasonable 
construction of conclusion of Law No. Four. Noises which 
which will "disturb the peace and quiet of the neighbor-
hood'' are enjoined. The decree itself d,oes nol use the 
particular lang-uage complained of and in the last analy-
sis it is the language of the decree which controls; the con-
clusions and finding are only helpful in construing the 
decree in event it is ambiguous. 
IV. FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT \VAS 
UUILTY OF CONTEl\1:PT. 
On page 23 of the brief appellant contends that pre-
judicial error was committed in finding him to be guilty 
of contempt without a hearing. In the decree the court 
adjudged that the appellant was guilty of contempt of 
court. It is true that there was no order to show cause 
issued against the defendant to cite him for contempt. 
But it does not follo-w that he had no hearing on the mat-
ter. It developed at the trial that the appellant had been 
operating his mill in violation of the court order. (R. 
95, 112). A previous order to show cause had issued and 
a hearing had been held at which time the defendant was 
admonished and the order was explained to him. (R. 25). 
When it appeared to the court during the trial that the 
defendant had violated the order again, the court on its 
own motion found him guilty of contempt of court. It 
imposed no fine or other punishment and we cannot con-
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ceive how this could be 'Prejudicial. But if it were pre-
judicial, we submit that the court had authority, when 
the contempt came to its official attention, to take action 
thereon. 
V. OTHER ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
Eleven assignments of error are made. Only five 
are specifically argued. We assume that the others have 
been abandoned. As this court said in Palfreyman v. 
Bates, 108 Utah 142, 158 P. 2d. 132: 
''This court does not look with favor upon 
the caus·e of a litigant who raises points and casts 
them in the lap of the court for research and de-
termination, and if this is done, it is within the 
discretion of the court to refuse to consider 
them.'' Citing cases. 
We do not desire to prolong this brief answering assign-
ments of error which are not argued. We, therefore, 
limit ourselves to brief comments on the assignments 
made but not argued by appellant. 
(A) Assignment No. 2 is that the court erred in 
finding that the increased horsepower increased the 
noise. The court did not so find. It found that the in-
creased activity of new buildings, outside machinery, in-
creased horsepower, etc., caused an incr·ease in the 
amount of nois·e. (R. 40-21). T·he reference to the record 
in our statement of the evidence shows that several wit-
nesses testified to this effect and in particular that the 
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out~ide planer increased the noise v~ry ~mbstantially. 
For exmnple see (R~·s7, 72, 99, 111). 
(B) Assignn1ent No. 3 is that the court erred in 
finding that defendant had never operated the mill after 
6 :00 p.In. prior to 1943. The finding is tha;t he did g1o 
there himself and engaged in work, but it did not cause 
noise that would disturb the neighborhood. (Finding 
No.7, R. 42). This is abundanty supported by the record 
(R. 73, 77, 83, 88, 107, 108). 
The remaining assign1nents of error are sufficiently 
an::-wered in our general discussion of the Utah cases 
under Part I of the brief. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the decree was properly 
entered. The plaintiffs sought only relief from the noise. 
They asked no money damages. They did not seek to 
have him tear down his new building or to remove his 
machinery. They just wanted him to confine all of his 
machines to enclosed buildings and to not operate those 
which make excessive noise after 6:00 p.m. and until a 
reasonable hour the next morning so that they could oc-
cupy their property for residential purposes. Without 
the injunction it is clear that the appellant would operate 
his mill without regard to the welfare of others. If it 
suited his convenienee to make loud noises at 3:00a.m. 
he would do so in co1nplete disregard of the rights of 
others. It is a stronger case than Brough v. Ute Starn-
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pede Ass 'n, where plaintiff was only harrassed by noise 
for a few days each year. Here the noise is constant 
every night the entire year. It also appears to be a 
stronger case than Thompson v. Anderson, supra, where 
a small business behind a man's house used power driven 
equipment. This is a full fledged lumber mill with saws, 
planers, rippers, ete., which can be heard for blocks. The 
appellant has been persistant in enlarging his mill and 
his operations. No one would complain if he went back 
'to his 1943 operation. But in a commercial zone, adjacent 
to homes, he simply can not ·expand indefinitely and oper-
ate eighteen hours a day in complete disregard of the 
rights of others. 
RespectfuU;y S1J)bmitt•e:d, 
CLYDE, MECHAM and WHITE 
Attorneys for PZainfJiffs 
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